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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the interest in aid effectiveness has grown exponentially, with a 
proliferation of both praxis-oriented evaluations and academic studies. At the same time, 
the rising interest in “fragile states” has prompted the aid-effectiveness literature to focus 
its attention on this category of states. Parallel to the development of the aid-effectiveness 
literature, the literature on the impact of specific development-aid sectors has also surged. 
The increasing number of analyses on the impact of external policies contributing to 
processes of political transformation (democratisation or stabilisation) has been 
remarkable. This discussion paper thematises the growing literature on both fragility and 
the effectiveness of democracy support, with a special focus on the quantitative literature. 
Its novelty lies in its contribution of drawing links between these different bodies of 
literature. In other words, how does the positive outlook of the quantitative literature – 
with regards to the general effectiveness of democracy-support policies – relate to a more 
complex definition of fragility? Relevant articles and books are identified and reviewed, 
whereby three to four central pieces are used to articulate the argument in each section. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, the interest in aid effectiveness has grown exponentially, with a 
proliferation of both praxis-oriented evaluations and academic studies. At the same time, 
the rising interest in “fragile states” has prompted the aid-effectiveness literature to focus 
its attention on this category of states. Leading questions included whether development 
aid contributes to growth or to a political turnaround in fragile states (Chauvet / Collier 
2008), and whether factors that usually contribute to the effectiveness of development aid 
in general have the same impact in fragile states (Baliamoune-Lutz 2009). The definition 
of “fragile states,” however, has evolved faster than this literature has accounted for. The 
latter has continued to embrace a one-dimensional definition that only accounts for one 
overall level of fragility, but does not examine the different dimensions of statehood (see 
Section 2 below). 
Parallel to the development of the aid-effectiveness literature, the literature on the impact 
of specific development-aid sectors has also surged. The increasing number of analyses on 
the impact of external policies contributing to processes of political transformation 
(democratisation or stabilisation) has been remarkable. The qualitative case-specific 
literature, for instance, has addressed peace-keeping and peace-building missions, in 
addition to state-building and democracy-support policies, in specific country contexts. 
The quantitative literature, on the other hand, has tried to analyse the average impact of 
peace-keeping missions and democracy-support policies. Still, communication among 
quantitative and qualitative research design practitioners has been rather limited (see 
Doorenspleet / Kopecký 2008, 709; see also Goertz / Mahoney 2012). 
This discussion paper thematises the growing literature on both fragility and the 
effectiveness of democracy support, with a special focus on the quantitative literature. Its 
novelty lies in its contribution of drawing links between these different bodies of 
literature. Relevant articles and books are identified and reviewed, whereby three to four 
central pieces are used to articulate the argument in each section.  
The structure of the paper displays those questions linking the literature on fragility with 
the (quantitative) literature on the effectiveness of democracy support. Section 2 offers a 
brief review of the literature on the concept of fragility; Section 3 deals with the literature 
on processes of political transformation in fragile states; Section 4 analyses the literature 
on external interventions in fragile states; Section 5 mainly deals with the quantitative 
literature on the effectiveness of those policies contributing to democratisation or 
stabilisation; and Section 6 tries to define factors that the effectiveness literature should 
take into account when focusing on contexts of fragility. Research gaps are thematised in 
the paper and again listed in the conclusion in the attempt to scope possible next steps for 
academic inquiry. 
2 Fragility: a matter of degree or of kind? 
There are at least two reasons why the concept of fragility is generally important for both 
academics and practitioners. Its definition is likely to affect the decision-making processes 
of donors. And at the same time, “fragility” is likely to have an impact on the 
effectiveness of donors’ policies. The concept, however, is still developing, and, despite 
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ample debates among academics and practitioners, a consensus on its definition has been 
difficult to achieve. This section reviews its evolution over the past decade. The next 
section analyses how the literature has dealt with processes of political transformation in 
contexts of fragility, and whether or not this literature has been informed by the evolution 
of the concept.  
The concept of fragility has gone through a steep maturation process (see Browne 2007, 
11; Cammack et al. 2006, ix; and Carment / Samy / Prest 2008, 351–352) and has evolved 
in two different directions. First, the definition of fragility has moved away from the state 
as the “monopoly holder” (see Wennmann 2010, 16). Scholars are now looking beyond 
the concept of state into other forms of social and political organisation that are subject to 
fragility (see Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond 2011; Wennmann 2010). Second, and perhaps 
most relevant to this paper, the concept of fragility is becoming more complex.  
States now classified as “fragile” initially belonged to various unrelated and partial 
categories, such as anarchic vs. phantom states (Gros 1996) and post-colonial or quasi-
states (Jackson 1990). Later authors classified “fragile states” using an additive index, 
which would rank them according to their (uni-dimensional) degree of fragility: as weak, 
failing, failed or collapsed states (see Rotberg 2003; see also Faust / Grävingholt / Ziaja 
forthcoming).  
In these rankings, however, a number of states were grouped with one another without 
having anything more in common than their alleged degree of fragility. The consciousness 
about the heterogeneity of fragile states, therefore, generated another forward movement 
among scholars and practitioners alike. They started thinking about the intrinsic 
characteristics of a state, i.e. its capacity, authority and legitimacy, and ended up 
classifying states in clusters (see Brinkerhoff 2007; Call 2010; Carment / Samy / Prest 
2008; François / Sud 2006; and Goldstone 2008). 
Call was one of the first scholars to dispute “the utility of universal rankings of ‘fragile’ or 
‘failing’ states” (2010, 304), proposing instead discrete categories of analysis to better 
identify specific problems and contextually appropriate solutions. Call’s categories 
indicate three crucial – overlapping and interrelated – gaps that should provide a lens for 
analysing the challenges faced by states and formulating policies: the capacity gap (i.e. the 
degree that state institutions are able to provide or regulate the minimal provision of core 
public goods); the security gap (present in countries in the midst of armed conflict and/or 
just emerging from warfare); and the legitimacy gap (i.e. whether the regime’s rules 
and/or processes are sufficiently transparent and accountable to permit popular free 
expression and participation). According to Call, a donor’s failure in acknowledging these 
gaps devolves into ineffective policies (see also François / Sud 2006, 149).    
Along the same lines, Besley / Persson (2011) formally explore the origins of state 
fragility, highlighting two main pathologies that are related to state capacity and violence: 
“state ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods 
and raising revenues, and political violence either in the form of repression or civil 
conflict” (Besley / Persson 2011, 373; also in Besley / Persson 2010). They define an 
ineffective state as one that has made few investments in fiscal and legal capacities, and a 
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violent state as one in which the government and opposition invest in violence to maintain 
or acquire political power.1   
Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum (2012) establish a “fragility typology” also based on the 
three dimensions of capacity, authority and legitimacy. This multi-dimensional definition 
of fragility goes further than Besley / Persson’s (2011) two-dimensional definition, which 
uses “state effectiveness” and “political violence”. Furthermore, where Call (2010) looked 
at a dimension’s presence or absence, Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum (2012) use cross-
country data to measure the degree to which this given dimension is present within a state 
to identify differentiated country clusters. 
This multi-dimensional characterisation of fragility has yet to inform, among other things, 
the broader literature on processes of political transformation or aid effectiveness in these 
contexts. This could have serious practical as well as theoretical implications. Using the 
typology could help academia to better assess the effectiveness of certain types of policies. 
And it might also offer a chance for donors to better tailor their policies with regards to 
specific country contexts. In what follows, we analyse how the academic literature has 
incorporated, or not, the issue of fragility in its analyses of processes of political 
transformation and the evaluation of external policies supporting those processes.  
3 Democratisation and fragility 
The literature on processes of political transformation in contexts of fragility usually 
responds to one of three approaches: the process of state failure, the persistence of state 
failure or the way out of state failure. As mentioned earlier, none of these approaches has 
yet incorporated the multi-dimensional definition of fragility.  
Furthermore, democratisation in contexts of fragility, as a process of political 
transformation, has been repeatedly thematised in the academic literature.2 And its role 
with regards to fragility has been hotly debated, in terms of either contributing to fragility 
or to stability. This controversy is briefly reviewed in this section. The following sections 
further examine the literature on the role of external donors in processes of 
democratisation, and their effectiveness.  
                                                 
1  In their analysis, they differentiate between determinants and symptoms but focus on the former. They 
assume that the degree of common interest, the existence of cohesive institutions, the presence of 
resource rents and the technologies for organising and conducting violence constitute the determinants 
of fragile states and the independent variables that situate a state along two dimensions: state capacity 
and violence. On the other hand, “phenomena like civil war, repression, low income per capita, low 
spending on common interest goods, low taxation, and weak enforcement of property rights are all 
symptoms rather than determinants” (Besley / Persson 2011, 386). This difference between symptoms 
and determinants is of consequence not only for the thorough understanding of the concept of fragility, 
but also for policy design – as far as the latter deals with the root causes of fragility, and not just with its 
symptoms. 
2  As we concentrate on processes of political transformation, the literature also acknowledges that 
democratisation is not an inevitable process: liberalisation can arise within already stable or stabilising 
autocracies (Schneider / Schmitter 2004, 29), e.g. China; conflict can persist where peace-building or 
peace-keeping operations fail, e.g. DRC; and/or an unsuccessful institution-building (state-building) 
process may prevent an increase in capability, authority and legitimacy, e.g. Afghanistan, inhibiting any 
significant progress towards democracy (see Coppedge et al. 2011 on the measurement of democracy). 
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Authors indeed differ when considering the relationship between fragility (or the process 
of state failure) and democratisation. Collier (2009), for instance, sees democratisation as 
an uncertain process detached, to a certain extent, from state failure. State failure, in his 
view, responds to states being governed by a very small elite class, the “selectariat” being 
unable to credibly hold the ruler to account, and/or elections being subverted by the 
incumbent through illegitimate tactics to ensure victory (see Collier 2009, 226; see also 
Bueno de Mesquita / Smith 2011). These problems might be further exacerbated, 
according to Collier, by high levels of poverty as well as lack of social cohesion and 
resource wealth. In these circumstances, any process of democratisation “might at best be 
a two-edged sword, introducing the possibility of accountability but at the price of a 
greater risk of large-scale political violence” (Collier 2009, 233). 
Bates (2008), on the other hand, seems to include democracy – in addition to economic 
factors and ethnicity – as a determinant of state failure.3 Supporting Mansfield / Snyder 
(1995, 2002, 2007),4 Bates sanctions the idea that “democracy and underdevelopment 
appear to be a volatile combination” likely to result in a higher degree of fragility (Bates 
2008, 9). 
Mansfield / Snyder (2002) indeed analyse the effect of democratisation processes on 
conflict. However, their analysis argues for the positive relationship between 
democratisation processes and conflict in states that suffer from institutional weakness. In 
their book, Electing to Fight (2005), they show that “transitional countries that were 
comparatively well-endowed with the prerequisites for democratic politics, such as 
relatively competent and impartial state institutions, were unlikely to detour into 
violence” (2007, 5). 
Following their argumentation, it might appear that the relationship between 
democratisation and conflict might not be due to the democratisation process as such, but 
to eroded institutions that indeed tumble towards democratisation as a solution to their 
problems.5 This would contradict Bates’ (2008) thesis. According to this interpretation, 
democratisation would not be a direct cause of conflict, whereas it may indirectly 
contribute to conflict due to its intrinsic slowness and complexity (see also de Zeeuw / 
Kumar 2006, 12; Ottaway 1995, 239). This could explain that “not all newly 
democratizing states suffer from institutional weakness, but for those that do the resulting 
                                                 
3  According to Bates (2008), “those who study the impact of economic factors on political disorder focus 
on the impacts of poverty (Sambanis / Hegre 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010 vs. Fearon / Laitin 2003; 
Alexander / Harding 2007), public revenues (Skocpol 1979; Bates 2008), and natural resources (Collier 
2000; Collier / Hoeffler 2004; Mueller 2007).” On ethnicity, Bates cautions that it “proves to bear a 
less straightforward relationship to the likelihood of state failure than might be expected (Collier / 
Hoeffler 2004 vs. Fearon / Laitin 2003, 1996), but that rule by minorities indeed increases the 
likelihood of state failure (Padró i Miquel 2007).” Finally, “in addition to economic and cultural 
factors, scholars [Bates included] stress the role of democratization in state failure (Hegre et al. 2001; 
Mansfield / Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000; Bates 2008).” 
4  Other scholars that have contributed to questioning the peacefulness of the democratisation process 
include Gleditsch / Ward (2000); Goldsmith (2010); Mann (1999, 2005); Narang / Nelson (2009); 
among others.  
5  Goldstone (2008, 288) suggests five major pathways “that comprise the most common processes 
leading to state failure”: escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious) conflicts; state predation 
(corrupt or crony corralling of resources at the expense of other groups); regional or guerrilla rebellion; 
democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d’etat); and succession or reform crisis in authoritarian 
states. “These pathways are not exclusive, and may combine in various sequences.”  
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political dynamic creates conditions that encourage hostilities” (Mansfield / Snyder 2002, 
301). 
In short, authors differ when assessing the role democratisation plays in contributing to – 
or guarding a state from – fragility. Some argue for the higher likelihood of conflict in a 
fragile state entering a process of democratisation. Others note that democratisation could 
indeed help in the institutional build-up of a state, but could also prematurely open up a 
society’s political spectrum, engendering violent conflict. Therefore, timing is key, as well 
as the specific country context where the democratisation process takes place.  
4 On external support of democratisation processes in contexts of 
fragility 
According to the literature, donors need to address a number of challenges when 
supporting democratisation in a state with weak institutions or a generally unstable state. 
These challenges can be tagged as follows: first, of course, is the issue of the available 
range of policies aimed at supporting the political transformation of a country; namely, 
what can donors do to support democracy while avoiding further deterioration in a specific 
country context. Second is the issue of whether donors should sequence their policies or 
support all processes at once; in other words, should donors help build institutions before 
promoting democratic principles, or should they combine both policies? (See Leininger / 
Grimm / Freyburg 2012).6 In this section, we focus on the latter. 
Any policy design or policy response might essentially depend on the internal 
characteristics of a country. The academic literature, however, has argued that there might 
be a temporal lag at play. Sequencing might be more appropriate in the very first phase of 
political transformation, and a simultaneous but gradual approach might be necessary after 
reaching a certain degree of stability.  
This is at least one of the conclusions reached by Carothers vs. Mansfield / Snyder (2007) 
in their debate on the potential sequencing in the institutional build-up of a state. While 
Carothers recognises state-building as a necessary prerequisite for democratisation in 
weak or collapsed states, in a second stage, he advocates a gradualist approach to 
democratisation. Directly addressing scholars like Mansfield and Snyder, Carothers claims 
that “democratic gradualism is different from sequencing. It does not entail putting off for 
decades or indefinitely the core element of democratization – the development of fair and 
open processes of political competition and choice. It involves reaching for the core 
element now, but doing so in iterative and cumulative ways rather than all at once. 
Gradualism can take different forms depending on the context” (Carothers 2007, 25). 
Mansfield  / Snyder, in turn respond that what they argued for was “that it is dangerous to 
push states to democratize before the necessary preconditions are in place and that 
                                                 
6  External interventions supporting political transformations in third countries comprise state- or peace-
building, or democracy-support policies. These three policies may overlap in terms of instruments and 
goals, but they also include distinguishing characteristics, i.e. a focus on post-conflict stabilisation 
(peace-building), on setting the stage for or actually improving the democratisation experience (state-
building), or on full-blown top-down and bottom-up system transformation or consolidation (democracy 
support).  
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prudent democracy-promotion efforts should pay special attention to fostering those 
preconditions” (Mansfield / Snyder 2007, 5). In other words, they did not advocate for 
any transitional template (state-building first and democratisation later), but for prudence 
and humility of external democracy promoters.  
Effective and stable7 institutions, therefore, have come to be seen as a prerequisite (or a 
necessary – though not sufficient – condition) for successful political and economic 
liberalisation (see Goldstone / Ulfelder 2004; Levitsky / Murillo 2009; Paris 2004; Paris / 
Sisk 2009; Schneider / Schmitter 2004).8 And state-building has emerged as a critical 
element, at least during the first phase of a country’s political transformation.9 Still, 
differences between state-building and democracy-support policies have not been 
systematically addressed; neither has the literature addressed the criteria that policy-
makers use to decide whether to implement both policies sequentially or simultaneously 
(see Leininger / Grimm / Freyburg 2012).10 
The relevance that state-building has gained within the literature, however, should not be 
understated. Especially in post-conflict environments – where scholars and practitioners 
had under-emphasised the importance of stable and capable state institutions for decades 
(see Paris / Sisk 2009, 8)11 – the merging of state- and peace-building programmes has had 
crucial implications. In practice, for instance, multi-dimensional (civil and military) peace-
keeping operations, combining both short- and long-term measures for sustainable peace, 
are on their way to becoming the norm rather than the exception (see Fortna 2008; Joshi 
2010, 829–830).12  
Furthermore, the literature seems to support the idea that state-building is a necessary 
element to attain stability in all possible contexts of fragility, not only in peace-building 
contexts (see Schneckener 2011, 235). As we saw in Section 2, contexts of fragility can be 
                                                 
7  Letvitsky / Murillo (2009) distinguish two dimensions of institutional strength, enforcement and 
stability, arguing that different levels of these two elements have important effects on actors’ 
expectations and behaviour, and the institutional design they would support.  
8  Interesting to note is that the OECD, in its Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, states as its third principle, precisely, the need to “focus on 
statebuilding as the central objective.” 
9  Schneckener (2011, 235) defines state-building as aiming at “strengthening state structures and 
institutions as well as the capacities for the state apparatus to govern.”   
10  Some scholars seem to agree on the fact that stability is a necessary element for economic, but also 
political liberalisation. According to Goldstone / Ulfelder, for instance, “the key to maintaining stability 
appears to lie in the development of democratic institutions that promote fair and open competition, 
avoid political polarization and factionalism, and impose substantial constraints on executive 
authority” (2004, 10). Others – usually critical of foreign intervention in general – see both terms as 
reflecting opposing policy strategies, i.e. donors intend stability, and consider democracy as an obstacle 
more than an asset. The debate on the relationship between democratisation and stabilisation, in other 
words, has not been sealed yet, developing mostly at a non-empirical, prescriptive or descriptive, level.  
11  This new awareness was also reflected on the practitioners’ side when, a few years later, the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee merged the two working groups on fragile states and on conflict 
prevention into the International Network on Conflict and Fragility, bringing together both the peace- 
and the state-building debates (Grävingholt / Gänzle / Ziaja 2009).  
12  Taking this relationship as a given, Brinkerhoff’s (2011, 132) analysis pleads for increasing the weight 
of governance reforms, in their link to conflict mitigation, for better stabilisation and reconstruction 
outcomes. These governance reforms would connect, in his view, citizens and the state at sub-national 
levels by reviewing how decentralisation, citizen participation and service delivery has an effect on 
post-conflict countries.  
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defined by the complex interaction of a number of factors, namely the defining 
dimensions of statehood, i.e. authority, capacity and legitimacy (see Call 2010; 
Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum 2012), as well as other internal or external factors, i.e. 
levels of inequality, growth of gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, aid 
fractionalisation, etc. (see Brinkerhoff 2011, 143; Schneckener 2011, 232; see also Call / 
Cook 2003; Diamond 2006; Wennmann 2010). State-building, according to Paris / Sisk 
(2009, 1), would reinforce all three dimensions.13 Still, the specific outlook of state-
building policies in different contexts of fragility has not yet been systematically 
examined.14 
According to Paris / Sisk (2009, 13; see also Brinkerhoff 2010), both scholars and 
practitioners do not fully grasp the complexities inherent in any state-building process. 
This seems to increase the number of critical accounts of state- and peace-building (see, 
for instance, Wesley 2008, also Hameiri 2009). Some authors list alternatives to state- and 
peace-building such as stopping any external intervention (Herbst 2004; Weinstein 2005), 
stocking up on resources or increasing the strategic coordination among donors. Others, 
like Paris / Sisk (2009, 11; see also Paris 2010, 347–354), allege that these alternatives do 
not fully grasp and respond to the inherent challenges presented by these policies, such as 
the sustainability of results and the legitimacy of interventions. 
In conclusion, there seems to be an overall agreement within the literature that state- and 
peace-building are prerequisites for successful democratisation, and (should) contribute to 
stability by strengthening institutions. The design of state-building policies, moreover, 
should crucially depend on the specific country context – for instance, the type of feasible 
and desirable political settlements in place (see Brown / Grävingholt 2011; di John / 
Putzel 2009). Favourable internal and external factors will likely give the donor more 
space to manoeuvre, and attention to these factors would, in turn, increase these policies’ 
impact.15 Unfortunately, however, external donors are still grappling with how to take 
these factors into account. In addition to the low number of systematic analyses on state-
building-support effectiveness, this increases the number of normative-critical reports. But 
what most of these reports demand is twofold: a higher context-sensitivity in policy-
                                                 
13  According to Paris / Sisk (2009, 1–2), “statebuilding is a particular approach to peacebuilding, 
premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil 
war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions.” 
14  Patrick / Brown (2007) are the first to take up the colossal task of describing whole-of-government 
strategies for fragile environments in different donor countries, i.e. the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and Sweden. They intend to catalogue advances made in 
policy coherence, the resources and instruments available to implement joined-up approaches, and the 
early implications of pilot projects. Their descriptive methodology, however, lacks the analytical 
character that would enable them to draw generalising conclusions on instruments’ effectiveness with 
regards to fragility. However, they do set the conceptual stage for empirically-based research in this 
regard.  
15  O’Donnell / Schmitter / Whitehead already stressed, in their four-volume work Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule (1986), the fact that internal forces are crucial to any transition to democracy, as 
opposed to international or external factors, which only play a secondary role (see also Almond / Verba 
1963; Muller / Seligson 1994; Muller 1988; Rueschemeyer / Huber-Stephens / Stephens 1992; 
Vanhanen 1997; Bollen 1979; Casper / Taylor 1996; Moore 1993; Przeworski 1988). Linz / Stepan 
(1996) challenged this assertion and advanced some hypothesis pointing to the importance of 
international influences: foreign policies, zeitgeist and diffusion effects (see Gleditsch / Ward 2006; see 
also Booth 2011). 
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making,16 and thorough micro- and macro- effectiveness studies on the academic side. The 
following section reviews how the academic literature has so far handled the latter.  
5 On the effectiveness of external policies supporting processes of political 
transformation 
While state-building seems to be an integral part of both peace-building and democracy-
support policies, it is not explicitly mentioned in the quantitative effectiveness literature. 
Only practice-oriented policy evaluations (see Grävingholt / Leininger / von Haldenwang 
2012), or theoretical or qualitative analysis (see Call / Wyeth 2008; de Zeeuw / Kumar 
2006) take state-building policies as impending targets of their analyses.17 Quantitative 
analyses on the impact of external interventions on democratisation processes, on the other 
hand, focus on three different (but interrelated) types of interventions: aid in general, 
peace-building and democracy support.  
Both the (quantitative) aid-effectiveness literature and the literature on the effectiveness of 
democracy-support policies analyse average effects, controlling perhaps for geographical 
regions or types of regimes (see Cornell 2012). They do not explicitly account for 
statehood dimensions, namely capacity, authority and legitimacy, even though these 
factors could potentially have an impact on policy effectiveness. The peace-building 
literature confines its universe of cases to post-conflict environments and multilateral 
interventions in these contexts (see, for instance, Doyle / Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; 
Paris / Sisk 2009; Zürcher 2011; Zürcher et al. 2013). But it does not further qualify and 
differentiate among post-conflict contexts. 
While the impact of aid on democratisation is still an issue within this literature,18 there 
seems to be a tacit agreement that the average effect of democracy-support policies on 
                                                 
16  At the same time, the question persists over whether, or to what extent, external interventions are 
legitimate and local ownership is warranted, in the frame of contexts of fragility (see Donais 2009). 
With regards to state-building, one could think that the inevitability of the process to attain a minimum 
degree of stability might reduce in first instance the need for locals to take ownership (see Chesterman 
2007; Narten 2009; Schneckener 2011). Or as Chesterman (2007, 7) puts it: “Ownership is certainly the 
intended end of such [post-conflict] operations, but almost by definition it is not the means” (see also 
Chesterman 2007, 18–19; Schneckener 2011, 249).  
17  See also Bassu (2008) and Roessler (2005). De Zeeuw / Kumar (2006) edit a volume in which they pick 
three state-building sub-sectors in post-conflict states, i.e. support for elections and political party 
development, human rights assistance, and support to independent media development, with three to 
four different country case studies for each sub-sector, i.e. Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique; 
Guatemala, Cambodia and Sierra Leone; and Rwanda, El Salvador and Afghanistan. Despite departing, 
as they say, from the tradition of country- and topic-specific research, one caveat to their methodology is 
the difficulty of cross-country and -issue comparisons.   
18  See Baliamoune-Lutz (2009, 879) for a compilation of the two opposing strands of research, defending 
on the one hand the positive influence of aid on policy-reform and democracy, through conditionality 
and its effect on income (Tavares 2003; Kilby 2005), and on the other hand, the weakening effect of aid 
on accountability and institutional reforms (Bräutigam / Knack 2004; Djankov / Montalvo / Reynal-
Querol 2008; Ear 2007; Knack 2004). Wright (2009, 553) and Wright / Winters (2010, 71) hypothesise 
a methodological issue as the reason for this contradiction. “Pessimistic findings generally estimate the 
average effect of foreign aid on political institutions or governance, whereas the more optimistic results 
stem from examining conditional effects” (Wright 2009, 553).  
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these processes is positive. At least this is the overall result of independent research in this 
area, and the focus of this section.  
Some methodological issues, however, need to be presented beforehand. When analysing 
the impact of democracy-support policies, the proxy most commonly used by scholars is 
hard data on “democracy assistance”, that is, financial data taken out of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “Government and Civil Society” 
budget line, or directly from donors’ budgets (most commonly from the US Agency for 
International Development, USAID). Other policies, such as conditionality, diplomacy or 
the level of coherence and fragmentation among donors, have not been systematically 
analysed as part of democracy-support policies, and are therefore not included in the 
calculations (see Burnell 2008, 245). Related to the latter is the fact that the intrinsic 
political nature of democracy support presents at least one key problem for the analysis of 
its effectiveness, namely, the fact that the publication of democracy-assistance allocation 
data directly depends on the donor’s commitment to transparency. There might be 
instances where donors prefer to keep funding as covert as possible, precisely in light of 
its effectiveness.  
Other methodological concerns, not directly related to data insufficiency, have been 
collected by Green / Kohl (2007, 156). They include, for instance, the direction of 
causality in the process, namely, whether democracy assistance leads to democratisation, 
or the other way around (endogeneity). Another methodological concern is the micro-
macro paradox (Mosley 1986), after which programmes might be individually effective 
but do not visibly contribute to the broader aim of democratisation. And another point they 
mention is the so-called impact attribution, that is, how one can specify whether the 
impact of a programme is only due to the programme, or to a favourable combination of 
other programmes, in addition to a beneficial country and international context.  
Kalyvitis / Vlachaki (2010) try to overcome some of these concerns with a comprehensive 
study that uses aggregate democracy assistance data from all donor countries. While the 
controversial study of Finkel et al. exclusively looks at USAID data, both their results are 
similar. Kalyvitis / Vlachaki (2010, 214) conclude “that democratic assistance, proxied 
here by Governance and Civil Society Aid, promotes future democratization in the 
recipient country. This result is robust to many sensitivity tests, including the scaling of 
aid flows, the measurement of democracy, the estimation methodology, and the potential 
endogeneity of aid flows.”  
Scott / Steele (2011) again analyse USAID’s democracy assistance effectiveness. Critical 
with scholars who analyse the effects on democratisation of general development-aid 
policies, they allege that carefully targeted democracy assistance has a greater impact on 
democratisation than more generic economic aid packages (2011, 48). At the same time, 
they are also critical with those scholars who “lump” together donors and policies, 
ignoring “considerable variation in the purposes of different foreign aid packages and 
different donors” (2011, 51). Hence, their research target is the impact of (USAID) 
democracy aid on democratisation in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, 
between 1988 and 2001. 
According to Scott / Steele (2011), two mechanisms link targeted aid to progress in 
democratisation in the beneficiary country. The first is “anticipated reactions”, where 
donors as well as recipients are rational (“strategic”) actors. Donors calculate the likely 
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effect of aid, and recipients encourage or accommodate democratic improvements to 
receive more development aid. The other mechanism is “agent empowerment”, where 
“democracy aid focuses on agent-centred assistance that empowers individuals, groups, 
and political institutions in a recipient country and therefore impacts democracy directly” 
(2011, 53). 
Their results are therefore positive. Scott / Steele (2011, 65) conclude that their analysis 
“supports two important conclusions: (i) democracy aid has a positive impact on 
democratization even when controlling for the effect of democratization on aid allocation 
decisions; (ii) democracy aid has a positive impact on democratization, while general 
foreign economic aid does not.” Still, the fact that they do not control for other US 
democracy assistance mechanisms, and other donors’ allocations, casts doubts on their 
results.19  
Savun / Tirone (2011) also remark on the positive effects of democracy assistance. They 
indeed come closest to analysing the effects of democracy-support policies in contexts of 
fragility by analysing its preventive role upon civil conflict. By using an instrumental 
variables approach that accounts for potential endogeneity problems in aid allocation,20 
they conclude that “there is a potential path to democracy that ameliorates the perils of 
democratization, and democracy assistance programs can play a significant positive role 
in this process” (2011, 241). 
Buying into Mansfield / Snyder’s argument that any process of democratisation will, with 
high likelihood, be unstable, Savun / Tirone (2011, 234) investigate “whether higher 
levels of external democracy aid can partially compensate for the instability created by 
democratic transition.” Their goal is to further develop recent work on democratisation 
that “shows a mostly positive relationship between democracy aid and democratization” 
(Finkel / Pérez-Linan / Seligson 2007; Kalyvitis / Vlachaki 2010; Scott / Steele 2011; 
Wright 2009) by assessing “whether democracy aid can provide political stability in a 
fragile environment” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 234). 
                                                 
19  Scott / Steele state that “even after controlling for other factors, and for the selections effect of 
democratization on aid allocations themselves, democracy aid exerts a statistically significant, positive, 
and substantively meaningful impact on democratization” (2011, 62). They use a simultaneous equation 
model examining the link between democracy aid and democratisation as simultaneous processes, where 
“one equation represents the strategic allocation of aid to promising recipients, and the second 
equation represents the impact of democracy aid on democratization” (2011, 56). In addition to this, 
they include a highly problematic cultural affinity control variable, allegedly to increase their confidence 
in the aid-democracy results, actually rendering non-significant any other variable that might be 
correlated to this multiple control variable. 
20  They deal with the issue of endogeneity by using instrumental variables analysis, estimating the 
endogenous variable (level of aid allocation) using an exogenous variable that is correlated with the 
endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the dependent variable (onset of civil conflict). “These 
criteria imply that any changes in the dependent variable that may result from changes in the values of 
an instrument must be attributable to the endogenous variable and must be unrelated to the reciprocal 
relationship between the dependent variable and the endogenous variable” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 239). 
Their two instrumental variables are donor GDP and affinity with the United States – the similarity in 
the two countries’ votes in the United Nations General Assembly in a given year (Gartzke / Jo 2006). 
“The results show that both instruments are significant predictors of the endogenous variable 
democracy aid” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 240). “In each model the effect of democracy aid on civil war 
onset during democratization remains negative and statistically significant” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 241). 
Democracy-support effectiveness in “fragile states”: a review  
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 11 
They divide democracy assistance programmes into three categories, depending on the 
object at hand: (a) state institutions, (b) civil society, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the media, and (c) electoral assistance. Then they discuss “how by bolstering 
both state institutions and civil society, which supports both top-down and bottom-up 
democratization, democracy aid can lower the risk of domestic political violence during 
the early phases of regime transition” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 235).  
Though they do not empirically pursue this programme differentiation, they find that 
“democratizing states that receive higher levels of aid are less likely to experience conflict 
than those that receive less aid” (Savun / Tirone 2011, 238). While democratisation 
processes are conflict-enhancing, those democratising states that do not receive 
democratisation aid are (over four times) more likely to experience civil wars than aid 
recipients. Still, according to Savun / Tirone, the relationship between democracy 
assistance and the likelihood of conflict is only statistically significant in cases where a 
democratisation process is already in place.21  
In short – and assuming that their instrumental variables approach is able to control for 
endogeneity – some questions arise directly from their analysis. First is the issue of 
whether democracy support can also generate a democratic process in contexts of fragility, 
in addition to responding to the instability born out of such a process. The second question 
is whether the specific fragility configuration of a country might affect the way in which 
democracy assistance impacts a given stabilisation and democratisation process.  
6 On the determinants of effective democracy-support policies 
It is not difficult to imagine that when considering different contexts of fragility, scholars 
come up with various sets of (internal and external) determinants of aid effectiveness, as 
well as of democracy support. This has been the case in the qualitative single-case study 
literature.22 The quantitative literature, on the other hand, has indeed analysed the impact 
of individual determinants of aid effectiveness in general, or particularly in fragile states 
(albeit in its one-dimensional definition). But it has fallen short of empirically analysing 
the determinants of the effectiveness of democracy-support policies. 
With regards to the determinants of aid effectiveness in general, current quantitative 
analyses have focused on two different angles: the donor and the recipient. On the donor 
side, authors have mainly focused on two critical elements for aid effectiveness: donor 
                                                 
21  “We measure democratization as the change from year t-2 to year t in the 21-point Polity score from the 
Polity IV data” (Marshall et al. 2002). “Democratization is coded 1 if a country experiences a 3-point 
or more positive change in its Polity score during the previous two years, and 0 otherwise” (Savun / 
Tirone 2011, 237). 
22  See Moehler (2010, 33) for a list of democracy and governance (country-based) field experiments, 
completed or under way. “A quarter of the field experiments took place in post-conflict settings or in 
settings subject to ongoing conflict, such as Eastern DRC, and Afghanistan” (2010, 34). She groups 
studies according to types of interventions: elections, community-driven development (CDD) and 
reforms to improve public service delivery. She then analyses five potential limitations incurred by field 
experiments that can potentially lead to biases: the level of intervention and analysis; complexity of 
intervention; synergies and coordination with other programmes; best performers volunteer for impact 
evaluation; and research planning under ambiguity.  
  Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher 
12 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
fragmentation and coordination (see Djankov / Montalvo / Reynal-Querol 2008; Knack / 
Rahman 2007; Gibson et al. 2005; Knack / Smets 2012) and the manner in which aid is 
disbursed (see Cordella / Dell'Ariccia 2003). On the recipient side, determinants of aid 
effectiveness can be grouped into three broad categories: the political and institutional 
environment (Burnside / Dollar 2000; Svensson 1999; Collier / Dehn 2001; Guillaumont / 
Chauvet 2001; Chauvet / Guillaumont 2004; Collier / Hoeffler 2004; Dalgaard / Hansen / 
Tarp 2004), including regional and international aspects, such as diffusion (see Gleditsch / 
Ward 2006); the economic context (see, for instance, Collier / Dehn 2001; Pettersson 
2007); and geographical issues (see, for instance, Hansen / Tarp 2001).  
When focusing on contexts of fragility, authors can also be classified as using either the 
donor or the recipient perspective. Allegedly, however, determinants in these contexts 
have a different impact on aid effectiveness than in other developing countries or contexts 
(see Patrick / Brown 2007, 2).23 The following overview on the determinants of aid 
effectiveness in fragile states should set the stage for further research on possible 
determinants of effective democracy-support policies, specifically when looking at 
different contexts of fragility.  
With regards to the donor side, some authors have focused on the type of assistance, 
namely technical and financial assistance, as a determinant of aid effectiveness in the 
“turnaround” of failing states (see Chauvet / Collier 2008, 334).24 They conclude that 
while technical assistance has a positive effect with regards to a state’s turnaround – that 
is, the achievement and sustainability of radically improved policies and institutions – 
financial assistance does not. Therefore, especially in contexts of fragility, development 
aid needs to be especially tailored to have a positive impact therein. Unfortunately, 
Chauvet / Collier (2008) only focus on aid volumes and do not control for diffusion 
mechanisms, i.e. a democratising or autocratising neighbourhood,25 of conditionality 
principles (recognisably difficult for lack of indexes), both of which are likely to have an 
impact on aid effectiveness. Furthermore, should democracy support be considered part 
and parcel of technical assistance, one could assume it would also have a positive impact 
                                                 
23  However, Kim / Sikkink (2010) defend the opposite thesis. Taking three different types of transitions as 
research objects – democratic transition, transition from civil war and transition by state creation – they 
explore the effect of human rights prosecutions, i.e. trials or truth commissions, on “repression”, defined 
as “human rights violations”, i.e. torture, summary execution, disappearances and political 
imprisonment. One of their results is especially interesting to this review, namely that “although civil 
wars certainly exacerbate repression, human rights prosecutions still appear to have a positive impact 
on human rights protection in those situations” (2010, 956). This would mean that, at least in such a 
specific sub-sector as the protection of human rights, the logic between “transitioning” countries, 
including fragile states, is one and the same. 
24  Chauvet / Collier consider a failing state as a country with low income. They use as an income cut-off 
the criteria that the country should have been classified as a “low-income country” for at least one year 
by the World Bank. They continue by saying that not all low-income countries are failing states. As a 
cut-off for weakness in policy, institutions, and governance, they adopt a level of the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that is no better than 2.5 – a very low rating – adding the requirement 
that the CPIA should have been under the threshold of 2.5 for at least four consecutive years.  
 To make a turnaround, policies, institutions and governance must improve above the threshold for a 
failing state. They consider it to be sustained if the CPIA remains above 3 for at least two years after the 
turnaround is achieved (2008, 335–336). 
25  “External support can have a particularly dramatic impact on the relative power of groups when we see 
shifts in the coalitions that hold power in neighboring entitities” (Gleditsch / Ward 2006, 919). 
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in contexts of fragility. The quantitative literature on the effectiveness of democracy-
support policies would support this thesis (see Section 5 above).   
A rather descriptive strand of the aid allocation literature has dealt with aid scarcity and 
aid volatility as determinants of aid effectiveness in contexts of fragility (see Levin / 
Dollar 2005; and also Burnside / Dollar 2000; Carment / Samy / Prest 2008; Epstein / 
Gang 2009; François / Sud 2006; McGillivray 2006). Aid volatility might, indeed, be 
excruciating with regards to fragile states, since the unpredictability of funding might 
hinder long-term policy planning, and hamper sustainable progress. However, 
development aid and democracy support are not considered separately, specifically with 
regards to possibly diverging patterns of volatility and its impact – a gap that needs to be 
amended. 
With regards to the recipient side, other authors focus specifically on determinants of 
fragility. As we saw above, Chauvet / Collier (2008) look at fragility as a linear category, 
in terms of states upholding thresholds on poverty and political institutions. Besley / 
Persson (2011), on the other hand, analyse the heterogeneity of fragility, and establish a 
formal model to analyse the effects of development assistance therein. They formally and 
theoretically review the effects of cash aid, conditionality and non-cash development 
assistance in different contexts of state fragility. They conclude that aid effectiveness 
depends on the specific elements framing fragility, namely the degree of state 
ineffectiveness and political violence present in a given country. Their model suggests that 
development assistance can be effective, if it includes the right mix of development-aid 
instruments, but that it needs to be specifically tailored to country circumstances and 
institutions (Besley / Persson 2011, 395; see also Wright / Winters 2010). An empirical 
test of their theoretical formulations might help us understand the dynamics they describe. 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2009, 881) also contends that “the three factors (trade, institutions, and 
social cohesion) that are often hypothesized to be deep determinants (with positive effects) 
of income seem to have an ambiguous or negative correlation with income in fragile 
states.” Her results indicate, first, that “greater openness to trade may actually be harmful 
to fragile states, particularly in those countries that have high levels of export 
concentration since diversification enhances the positive effects of trade. Second, at least 
initially, improvements in political institutional quality also may be harmful. It seems that 
only a substantial improvement could have positive effects. Third, social cohesion has a 
threshold effect. Improvements in social cohesion produce positive effects only once it has 
reached a relatively high level. (…) Fourth, social cohesion seems to influence the 
effectiveness of political institutional reform” (2009, 886). Hence, the specificity of fragile 
states, as opposed to other developing countries, seems to be a given, but the latter could 
be further specified by differentiating among types of contexts of fragility.  
In conclusion, the literature on the determinants of aid effectiveness seems to 
acknowledge the specificity of fragile states and the need for effective development aid to 
be tailored to the specific context. Still, it has overlooked the fact that the category “fragile 
state” is rather heterogeneous and multi-dimensional. At the same time, despite the 
obvious progress made within the aid-effectiveness literature, it still needs to catch up to 
the literature on the effectiveness of democracy-support policies. It does not seem to be 
enough to assume similarities in both fields. Further research is warranted with regards to 
the determinants of the effectiveness of democracy-support policies, also when 
specifically looking at contexts of fragility.  
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7 Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to clarify concepts and draw links between different 
research strands. In this process, research gaps have become apparent within the academic 
literature on external interventions supporting political transformation in contexts of 
fragility.  
As outlined in Section 2 above, the very concept of fragility is still developing. Its multi-
dimensionality has led scholars and practitioners to cluster countries in relatively 
differentiated groups according to their levels in some of the dimensions of statehood, 
namely, capacity, authority and legitimacy.   
The adoption of such a multi-dimensional definition in other areas of the academic 
literature would enable scholars to fine-tune the empirical results and the theories on 
processes of political transformation. Additionally, and as we have seen in this paper, it 
offers a new lens to evaluate the existing literature on political transformations and on the 
effectiveness of external support. Furthermore, a number of research gaps have emerged in 
this literature review, which will need to be taken up in the near future.  
The first gap is the analytical distinction, operationalisation and measurement of 
democracy- and state-building support policies. Currently, the most commonly used proxy 
for democracy- and state-building support is the data of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee on “Government and Civil Society”. This proxy only accounts for 
volumes of aid and excludes other policies, with a possible impact upon a country’s 
process of political transformation, such as diplomacy, conditionality or sanctions. This 
exclusion might lead to omitted variable bias. Especially with regards to contexts of 
fragility, information on the specific policy combination – the level of diplomatic 
pressure, the use of conditionality clauses in trade agreements and the relative 
commitment to supporting civil society organisations – might add relevant information 
when analysing the effectiveness of external support mechanisms.  
The second gap is the scoping and classification of determining factors that might affect 
the impact of democracy-support and state-building policies. Looking at the recipient 
country, a number of factors might contribute to the success or failure both of the political 
transformation process and of external interventions supporting this transformation 
process. Additionally, this may vary when looking at the specific fragility cluster a 
country is a member of.  
In Section 6 above, we saw that intervening factors for aid effectiveness change when 
focusing on fragile states, as opposed to all countries in general. Yet the appraisal of these 
factors regarding democracy- and state-building support has not yet ensued. Still, these 
factors could constitute essential tools in testing the effectiveness of the aforementioned 
external interventions. And they would add precision to potential causal links between 
those policies and actual processes of political transformation in contexts of fragility.  
In conclusion, this article has tried to summarise the big debates around the literature on 
the effectiveness of democracy-support policies in contexts of fragility, as well as 
identifying a number of research gaps. These include, as mentioned above, the adoption of 
the multi-dimensional definition of fragility; the definition, operationalisation and 
measurement of state-building and democracy-support policies; and the classification of 
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determinants of the effectiveness of those policies. Addressing these gaps would likely 
contribute to policy-relevant analyses on the effectiveness of democracy-support policies.  
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